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What does your image pipeline prove about the artifact you deploy?

1 min read · main part only; folded sections are optional

After this you can answer: What does your image pipeline prove about the artifact you deploy?

A tag is a name; a digest identifies image content. Immutable tags prevent a later push from changing the bytes behind the same tag, but do not prove who produced those bytes. Authorization and build integrity remain separate concerns.

CI builds scan images and Trivy checks critical vulnerabilities with ignore-unfixed: true, plus the dated exceptions in .trivyignore. Publication uses native ARM64 images for Fargate and Lambda. Existing tags are inspected and reused instead of overwritten. The publish summary includes digests for traceability.

The pipeline sets provenance: false; do not claim signed build provenance or an attestation verification gate. A production improvement would scan the exact published digest and verify its approved origin before promotion. That introduces policy and key-management work as well as a tool choice. Exceptions also need owners and expiry review; a passing scan means the configured policy passed at that time, not that the image has no vulnerabilities.

Can a new advisory make the same image unsafe tomorrow?
Yes. Vulnerability knowledge changes without an image change. Re-scanning retained and running digests is a separate operational concern.
Why mention architecture?
CI scan images and published ARM64 images are separate builds. Platform-specific layers or dependencies can differ.
Would you refuse every vulnerability?
Set severity, exploitability and fixability policy, with reviewed temporary exceptions. An indiscriminate gate can encourage untracked bypasses.

Read the path chapter, select the relevant map piece →, then inspect infra/src/registry.ts → createRegistry. Work through the related case for a diagnostic example.

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