What does your image pipeline prove about the artifact you deploy?
After this you can answer: What does your image pipeline prove about the artifact you deploy?
Say it in 30 seconds
Section titled “Say it in 30 seconds”The deeper answer
Section titled “The deeper answer”A tag is a name; a digest identifies image content. Immutable tags prevent a later push from changing the bytes behind the same tag, but do not prove who produced those bytes. Authorization and build integrity remain separate concerns.
CI builds scan images and Trivy checks critical vulnerabilities with ignore-unfixed: true, plus the dated exceptions in .trivyignore. Publication uses native ARM64 images for Fargate and Lambda. Existing tags are inspected and reused instead of overwritten. The publish summary includes digests for traceability.
The pipeline sets provenance: false; do not claim signed build provenance or an attestation verification gate. A production improvement would scan the exact published digest and verify its approved origin before promotion. That introduces policy and key-management work as well as a tool choice. Exceptions also need owners and expiry review; a passing scan means the configured policy passed at that time, not that the image has no vulnerabilities.
Counter-questions
Section titled “Counter-questions”Can a new advisory make the same image unsafe tomorrow?
Why mention architecture?
Would you refuse every vulnerability?
Where in MiniTickets
Section titled “Where in MiniTickets”Read the path chapter, select the relevant map piece →, then inspect infra/src/registry.ts → createRegistry. Work through the related case for a diagnostic example.
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